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 Volume 5, Issue 7 (July 2018), Pages: 1-7


 Original Research Paper

 Title: Joint audit and financial scandal: The case of the French context

 Author(s): Jamel Azibi 1, 2, *


 1Accounting Department, Arab East College for Graduate Studies, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
 2Faculty of Law, Management and Economics Sciences of Jendouba, Jendouba, Tunisia

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The European Commission issued a proposal that encouraged the practice of joint audit on a voluntary basis. It recommended that mandatory audit firm rotation is extended from six years to nine years if joint audits are performed. This is considered as a new mechanism that increases audit quality and auditor independence. This new orientation of the EC Green Paper has an important impact on investor perception during the financial scandal announcement. In order to answer this question, we investigate the stock market reaction of SBF 250 after the disclosure of the financial scandal in presence of joint audit. Our sample is composed of 140 French listed enterprises. We use event study method and OLS regression. The empirical results demonstrate that the stock market of Non Big-Four clients does not significantly react compared to the firms audited by at least one Big Four in France. Contrary to this finding, the stock market reaction of the firms audited by two Big Four was significantly reacted compared to the enterprises audited by one Big at least in France. Those results demonstrate that joint audit with at least one Non-Big encouraged and especially in the Financial scandal periods and resolve the problem associated with the audit market concentration. 

 © 2018 The Authors. Published by IASE.

 This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (

 Keywords: Joint audit, Big four, Financial scandal, Market reaction

 Article History: Received 21 December 2017, Received in revised form 14 April 2018, Accepted 19 April 2018

 Digital Object Identifier:


 Azibi J (2018). Joint audit and financial scandal: The case of the French context. International Journal of Advanced and Applied Sciences, 5(7): 1-7

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