Affiliations:
School of Economics and Trade, Guangzhou Xinhua University, Guangzhou, China
The rapid rise of digital currencies has encouraged central banks to design their own central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). Among these, China’s digital currency (e-CNY) is a leading example, especially in the field of cross-border payments. However, the expansion of e-CNY raises serious concerns about money laundering risks. This study examines the regulation of e-CNY in cross-border payments and explores solutions to anti-money laundering (AML) challenges. The analysis applies cost-benefit theory and cooperative game theory. From a single-country perspective, the optimal level of AML regulation should balance costs and benefits, thereby maximizing net social gains. If AML regulation can significantly improve payment system efficiency, the optimal regulatory intensity should increase; if the efficiency gains are limited, a reduction is recommended. From a multi-country perspective, AML regulation involves both competition and cooperation. Game theory is applied to study cooperative and competitive strategies among monetary authorities. Using the Shapley value approach, this research shows that cooperative models provide greater benefits than independent regulation. Cooperation ensures stability, fair benefit distribution, and long-term effectiveness. Based on these findings, three recommendations are proposed: strengthen cross-border AML cooperation, draw lessons from private digital currencies, and integrate advanced technologies into AML regulation.
Digital currencies, Cross-border payments, Anti-money laundering, Cooperative game theory, Regulatory cooperation
https://doi.org/10.21833/ijaas.2025.10.022
Huang, Y. (2025). A study on anti-money laundering regulation in e-CNY cross-border payments. International Journal of Advanced and Applied Sciences, 12(10), 216–225. https://doi.org/10.21833/ijaas.2025.10.022